



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Keya Ramirez
DOCKET NO.: 12-30372.001-R-1
PARCEL NO.: 16-23-203-034-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Keya Ramirez, the appellant(s); and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds no change in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND: \$ 2,647
IMPR.: \$ 20,540
TOTAL: \$ 23,187

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2012 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject property is two-story, masonry and frame single-family townhome containing 1,363 square feet of living area. Features of the townhome include one and one-half baths, a full unfinished basement, and air conditioning. The property has a

2,647 square foot site and is located in Chicago, West Township, Cook County.

The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument, the appellant submitted an appraisal estimating the subject property had a market value of \$150,000 as of August 4, 2012. In addition, the appellant submitted one additional sale comparable not included in the appraisal.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$23,872. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$246,357 or \$180.75 per square foot of living area, land included, when using the 2012 three year average median level of assessment for Cook County of 9.69%.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment, the board of review's evidence included four equity comparables.

In rebuttal, the appellant distinguished the board of review's evidence based on location and upgrades including rooftop decks, garages, and three story construction. In support, the appellant included profile sheets for Wicker Park and Lawndale neighborhoods.

The board of review analyst, Mr. Joseph Power, objected to the appellant's appraisal, as the appraiser was not present at hearing, and was not available for cross examination.

At hearing, the appellant distinguished the board of review's comparables based on location and amenities. Specifically, the appellant stated that the board of review's comparables are located in superior areas with higher income brackets and include upgraded amenities such as garages and finished basements.

Conclusion of Law

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

The appellant contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the

property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The Board does not find the appraisal submitted by the appellant persuasive. At hearing, the board of review analyst argued that the appraisal was hearsay evidence because the appraiser was not able to testify. The Board finds this to be the case. For proceedings before the Board, "[t]he procedure, to the extent that the Board considers practicable, shall eliminate formal rules of pleading, practice and evidence,..."³⁵ ILCS 200/16180. However, in Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Ill.342,26 N. E.2d 130 (1940), the Supreme court of Illinois stated , [t]he rule against hearsay evidence, that a witness may testify only as to facts within his personal knowledge and not as to what someone else told him, is founded on the necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination, and is basic and not a technical rule of evidence." Novicki, 373 Ill. At 344. Thus, while the Board's rules allow for informal rules of evidence, the Board cannot repeal a basic rule of evidence under Supreme Court's holding in Novicki. Therefore, the Board finds that the appraisal is hearsay evidence for which no exception exists, and that the appraisal shall not be considered as relevant evidence in this appeal.

In looking at the appraisal's raw sales data, the Board finds that three of the appraisal's comparables analyzed were REO/short sales and the remaining two comparables were active listings. None of the sale comparables in the appraisal included arm's length transactions. Since the appraiser cannot testify as to why REO/short sales data and active listings were analyzed, these comparables cannot be used by the Board in finding the subject's fair market value. Therefore, the Board finds this argument unpersuasive.


Accordingly, in determining the fair market value of the subject property, the Board finds that the appellant failed to submit sufficient evidence to show the subject was overvalued. Therefore, the Board finds that the appellant has not met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and that the subject does not warrant a reduction based upon the market data submitted into evidence.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

Chairman



Member



Member

Member



Member

DISSENTING: _____

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: April 24, 2015



Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.