



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Cynthia Schroeder
DOCKET NO.: 09-24008.001-R-1
PARCEL NO.: 13-35-319-008-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Cynthia Schroeder, the appellant(s); and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds a reduction in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND: \$1,291
IMPR: \$3,115
TOTAL: \$4,406

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

ANALYSIS

The subject property consists of 3,150 square feet of land that is improved with a 108 year old, one-story, masonry, single-family dwelling containing 714 square feet of living area. The subject contains one baths and a full unfinished basement. The appellant argued that the fair market value of the subject was not accurately reflected in its assessed values.

In support of this overvaluation argument, the appellant stated in the pleadings that the subject sold on May 11, 2009 for \$49,500, or \$69.33 per square foot of living area. The appellant's pleadings further state that the sale was not between related parties, that the property was advertised on the open market for between three and six months, that a real estate broker was used, and that the seller's mortgage was not assumed. The pleadings further state that the subject was purchased pursuant to a foreclosure from the Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae. The appellant also submitted a warranty deed describing the transfer, a building inspection report for the subject, and a settlement statement for the transaction, which states that the appellant purchased the property on May 11, 2009 for \$49,500.

In the alternative, the appellant submitted three sales comparables, and one sales listing to show that the subject was

being overvalued. These comparables are described as one-story, frame or masonry, single-family dwellings that range in age from 51 to 106 years old, and in size from 822 to 1,422 square feet of living area. Two of the dwellings have a full, unfinished basement, one has a full basement with a formal recreation room, and one has a crawl. Additionally, two of the properties have air conditioning, and two have a two-car garage. The sales comparables sold in either June or July 2010 for between \$49,900 and \$54,900, or \$36.92 to \$66.79 per square foot of living area, including land. The listing is listed for \$36,100, or \$30.39 per square foot of living area. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject's assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" wherein the subject's final assessment of \$17,207 was disclosed. The subject's final assessment reflects a fair market value of \$193,337 when the 2009 Illinois Department of Revenue three-year median level of assessment for Class 2 properties of 8.90% is applied. In support of the subject's assessment, the board of review presented descriptions and assessment information on four suggested comparables described as one-story, masonry, single-family dwellings that range in age from 106 to 116 years old, and in size from 714 to 792 square feet of living area. Two of the suggested comparables have from one to one and one-half baths, and either a full unfinished basement, a partial unfinished basement, or a slab. Additionally, one property has a two-car garage. The comparables have improvement assessments ranging from \$19.22 to \$22.07 per square foot of living area.

The board of review also submitted a list of sales of properties located within the subject's neighborhood. This list included the PIN, deed number, the date of the sale, and the sale price for twenty properties. No further information was provided regarding these properties. Based on this evidence, the board requested confirmation of the subject's assessment.

After reviewing the record and considering the evidence, the Property Tax Appeal Board (the "Board") finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal. When overvaluation is claimed the appellant has the burden of proving the value of the property by a preponderance of the evidence. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 339 Ill. App. 3d 529, 545 (1st Dist. 2002); National City Bank of Michigan/Illinois v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 331 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042 (3d Dist. 2002) (citing Winnebago Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 313 Ill. App. 3d 179 (2d Dist. 2000)); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal, a recent arm's length sale of the subject property, recent sales of comparable properties, or recent construction costs of the subject property. Calumet Transfer, LLC v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 401 Ill. App. 3d 652, 655 (1st Dist. 2010); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.65(c). Furthermore, in general, "a contemporaneous sale between parties dealing at arms length is not only relevant to the question of fair cash market value, but [is] practically conclusive." Village of Lake

Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 132 (2004) (quoting People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry. Co. of Chi., 37 Ill. 2d 158, 161 (1967)). Having considered the evidence presented, the Board concludes that the evidence indicates a reduction is warranted.

In addressing the appellant's market value argument, the Board finds that the sale of the subject in May 2009 for \$49,500 is a "compulsory sales." A "compulsory sale" is defined as

(i) the sale of real estate for less than the amount owed to the mortgage lender or mortgagor, if the lender or mortgagor has agreed to the sale, commonly referred to as a "short sale" and (ii) the first sale of real estate owned by a financial institution as a result of a judgment of foreclosure, transfer pursuant to a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or consent judgment, occurring after the foreclosure proceeding is complete.

35 ILCS 200/1-23. Real property in Illinois must be assessed at its fair cash value, which can only be estimated absent any compulsion on either party.

Illinois law requires that all real property be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing, and able to sell but not compelled to do so, and the buyer is likewise ready, willing, and able to buy, but is not forced to do so.

Bd. of Educ. of Meridian Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 223 v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 961 N.E. 2d 794, 802 (2d Dist. 2011) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 69 Ill. App. 3d 207, 211 (2d Dist. 1979)).

However, the Illinois General Assembly recently provided very clear guidance for the Board with regards to compulsory sales. Section 16-183 of the Illinois Property Tax Code states as follows:

The Property Tax Appeal Board *shall* consider compulsory sales of comparable properties for the purpose of revising and correcting assessments, including those compulsory sales of comparable properties submitted by the taxpayer.

35 ILCS 200/16-183 (emphasis added).

The effective date of Section 16-183 is July 16, 2010, after the lien date for tax year 2009. Id. Therefore, it must be determined whether Section 16-183 can be retroactively applied. "In the absence of an express provision regarding the Act's temporal reach, [the Board] examine[s] whether the Act is substantive or procedural in nature." Doe v. Univ. of Chi., 404 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1012 (1st Dist. 2010) (citing Deicke Center-Marklund Children's Home v. Ill. Health Facilities

Planning Bd., 389 Ill. App. 3d 300, 303 (1st Dist. 2009)). "If the Act is procedural in nature, it may be applied retroactively as long as such retroactive application will not impair rights [either party] possessed when acting, increase [either party]'s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Doe, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (citing Deicke Center, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 303). "Procedure is the machinery for carrying on the [appeal], including pleading, process, evidence and practice . . ." Doe, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (citing Deicke Center, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 303). Furthermore, "In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a court is to apply the law in effect at the time of its decision, unless to do so results in manifest injustice." People v. Boatman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472 (4th Dist. 2008) (citing People v. Hardin, 203 Ill. App. 3d 374, 376 (2d Dist. 1990)).

The Board finds that Section 16-183 is a procedural act because it simply defines what evidence the Board must consider. Imposing Section 16-183 after the effective date does not create or impair any rights for either party, does not increase either party's liability for past conduct, does not impose new duties with regard to transactions already completed, and does not result in manifest injustice.

Section 16-183 uses the verb "shall" and, therefore, the Board is statutorily required to consider the compulsory recent sale of the subject. See Citizens Org. Project v. Dep't of Natural Res., 189 Ill. 2d 593, 598 (2000) (citing People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997)) ("When used in a statute, the word 'shall' is generally interpreted to mean that something is mandatory."). In doing so, the Board finds that the best evidence of the subject's market value is the sale of the subject in May 2009 for \$49,500. The Board gives diminished weight to the board of review's comparables since the market data submitted was only raw sales data.

Based on this record the Board finds that the subject property had a market value of \$49,500 for tax year 2009. Since market value has been determined, the 2009 Illinois Department of Revenue three-year median level of assessment for class 2 property of 8.90% shall apply. In applying this level of assessment to the subject, the total assessed value is \$4,406 while the subject's current total assessed value is above this amount. Therefore, the Board finds that a reduction is warranted.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

Ronald R. Cuit

Chairman

K. L. Fern

Member

Frank A. Huff

Member

Mario Morris

Member

J. R.

Member

DISSENTING: _____

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: September 21, 2012

Allen Castrovillari

Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing

complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.