



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Tom Doulas
DOCKET NO.: 08-23695.001-C-1
PARCEL NO.: 28-09-404-079-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Tom Doulas, the appellant(s), by attorney Steven B. Pearlman, of Steven B. Pearlman & Associates in Chicago; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds no change in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND: \$ 155,088
IMPR: \$ 205,172
TOTAL: \$ 360,260

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

ANALYSIS

The subject has 62,789 square feet of land, which is improved with a 22 year old, three-story, masonry, commercial office building. The subject's improvement size is 19,800 square feet of building area, which equates to an improvement assessment of \$10.36 per square foot of building area. Its total assessment is \$360,260, which yields a fair market value of \$948,053, or \$47.88 per square foot of building area (including land), after applying the 38% assessment level for commercial properties under the 2008 Cook County Classification of Real Property Ordinance. The appellant, via counsel, argued that there was unequal treatment in the assessment process of the subject's improvement, and also that the fair market value of the subject property was not accurately reflected in its assessed value as the bases of this appeal.

In support of the equity argument, the appellant submitted photos and descriptive and assessment information for three

properties suggested as comparable to the subject. The comparables are described as masonry, commercial buildings. Additionally, the comparables range: in age from 42 to 121 years; in size from 1,588 to 9,860 square feet of building area; and in improvement assessments from \$3.21 to \$11.49 per square foot of building area.

In support of the market value argument, the appellant submitted income and expense data for the subject property. In addition, the appellant submitted photos and descriptive and sales information for six sales comparables. The comparables are described as one-story or two-story, masonry, commercial buildings. Additionally, the comparables have from 1,588 to 16,561 square feet of building area. The comparables sold between April 2008 and October 2009 for \$45,000 to \$295,000, or \$21.03 to \$31.49 per square foot of building area, including land. Moreover, one of the sales comparables was a compulsory sale and two of the properties were sold at auction.

The Cook County Board of Review submitted its "Board of Review-Notes on Appeal," wherein the subject's final assessment of \$360,260 was disclosed. In support of the subject's assessment, the board of review submitted a property record card for the subject, and sales data for five commercial buildings located within ten miles of the subject. The comparables are described as multi-story, masonry, commercial buildings. Additionally, the comparables have from 15,676 to 21,315 square feet of building area. The comparables sold between March 2003 and June 2009 for \$1,034,000 to \$1,900,000, or \$61.78 to \$110.14 per square foot of building area, including land. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject's assessment.

As a preliminary matter, the administrative law judge allowed the appellant's court reporter to be present, but indicated that the Board's tape recording of the proceeding is the official record.

At hearing, the appellant's attorney submitted one exhibit. The exhibit is a map that shows the location of the previously submitted comparables. This evidence was allowed over the objection of the board of review's representative, as it was submitted for the purposes of clarification.

After reviewing the record, considering the evidence, and hearing the testimony, the Property Tax Appeal Board (the "Board") finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

When overvaluation is claimed, the appellant has the burden of proving the value of the property by a preponderance of the evidence. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 339 Ill. App. 3d 529, 545 (1st Dist. 2002); National City Bank of Michigan/Illinois v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 331 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042 (3d Dist. 2002) (citing Winnebago Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 313 Ill. App. 3d 179 (2d Dist. 2000)); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal, a recent arm's length sale of the subject property, recent sales of comparable properties, or recent construction costs of the subject property. Calumet Transfer, LLC v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 401 Ill. App. 3d 652, 655 (1st Dist. 2010); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.65(c). Having considered the evidence presented, the Board finds that the evidence indicates a reduction is not warranted.

In addressing the appellant's market value argument, the Board finds that one of the appellant's sales comparables is a "compulsory sale." A "compulsory sale" is defined as:

(i) the sale of real estate for less than the amount owed to the mortgage lender or mortgagor, if the lender or mortgagor has agreed to the sale, commonly referred to as a "short sale" and (ii) the first sale of real estate owned by a financial institution as a result of a judgment of foreclosure, transfer pursuant to a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or consent judgment, occurring after the foreclosure proceeding is complete.

35 ILCS 200/1-23. Real property in Illinois must be assessed at its fair cash value, which can only be estimated absent any compulsion on either party.

Illinois law requires that all real property be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing, and able to sell but not compelled to do so, and the buyer is likewise ready, willing, and able to buy, but is not forced to do so.

Bd. of Educ. of Meridian Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 223 v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 961 N.E. 2d 794, 802 (2d Dist. 2011) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 69 Ill. App. 3d 207, 211 (2d Dist. 1979)).

However, the Illinois General Assembly recently provided very clear guidance for the Board with regards to comparable

compulsory sales. Section 16-183 of the Illinois Property Tax Code states that, "The Property Tax Appeal Board shall consider compulsory sales of comparable properties for the purpose of revising and correcting assessments, including those compulsory sales of comparable properties submitted by the taxpayer." 35 ILCS 200/16-183. Prior to becoming law, this new section of the Property Tax Code was a part of Senate Bill 3334 of the 96th General Assembly.

The effective date of Section 16-183 is July 16, 2010, after the lien date for tax year 2008. Id. Therefore, it must be determined whether Section 16-183 can be retroactively applied. "In the absence of an express provision regarding the Act's temporal reach, [the Board] examine[s] whether the Act is substantive or procedural in nature." Doe v. Univ. of Chi., 404 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1012 (1st Dist. 2010) (citing Deicke Center-Marklund Children's Home v. Ill. Health Facilities Planning Bd., 389 Ill. App. 3d 300, 303 (1st Dist. 2009)). "If the Act is procedural in nature, it may be applied retroactively as long as such retroactive application will not impair rights [either party] possessed when acting, increase [either party]'s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Doe, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (citing Deicke Center, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 303). "Procedure is the machinery for carrying on the [appeal], including pleading, process, evidence and practice . . ." Doe, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (citing Deicke Center, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 303). Furthermore, "In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a court is to apply the law in effect at the time of its decision, unless to do so results in manifest injustice." People v. Boatman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472 (4th Dist. 2008) (citing People v. Hardin, 203 Ill. App. 3d 374, 376 (2d Dist. 1990)).

The Board finds that Section 16-183 is a procedural act because it simply defines what evidence the Board must consider. Imposing Section 16-183 after the effective date does not create or impair any rights for either party, does not increase either party's liability for past conduct, does not impose new duties with regard to transactions already completed, and does not result in manifest injustice.

Section 16-183 uses the verb "shall" and, therefore, the Board is statutorily required to consider the sales comparable submitted by the appellant that was a compulsory sale. See Citizens Org. Project v. Dep't of Natural Res., 189 Ill. 2d 593, 598 (2000) (citing People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997))

("When used in a statute, the word 'shall' is generally interpreted to mean that something is mandatory.").

The Board finds that Comparable #4 submitted by the appellant, and Comparables #1, and #5 submitted by the board of review were most similar to the subject in size, style, exterior construction, and features. Due to their similarities to the subject, these comparables received the most weight in the Board's analysis. These comparables had a price per square foot that ranged from \$22.34 to \$110.14, including land. The subject's price per square foot of \$47.88 is within the range established by the most similar comparables. Therefore, after considering adjustments and differences in both parties' comparables when compared to the subject, the Board finds that the subject is not overvalued, and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted based on the sales comparables submitted by the parties.

The appellant contends unequal treatment in the subject's improvement assessment as the basis of this appeal. Taxpayers who object to an assessment on the basis of lack of uniformity bear the burden of proving the disparity of assessment valuations by clear and convincing evidence. Walsh v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 181 Ill. 2d 228, 234 (1998) (citing Kankakee Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 131 Ill. 2d 1 (1989)); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.63(e). To succeed in an appeal based on lack of uniformity, the appellant must submit documentation "showing the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the assessment comparables to the subject property." Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 403 Ill. App. 3d 139, 145 (1st Dist. 2010); 86 Ill. Admin. Code § 1910.65(b). "[T]he critical consideration is not the number of allegedly similar properties, but whether they are in fact 'comparable' to the subject property." Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 403 Ill. App. 3d at 145 (citing DuPage Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 284 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654-55 (2d Dist. 1996)). After an analysis of the assessment data, the Board finds that the appellant has not met this burden.

The Board finds that none of the comparables submitted by the appellant were similar to the subject in location, size, and style. As such, the Board finds that the appellant has not met the burden of clear and convincing evidence, as there is no range of equity comparables with which to compare the subject. Therefore, the Board finds the subject's improvement assessment

is equitable and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

As to the income and expense information submitted by the appellant, the Board gives the appellant's argument little weight. In Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d 428 (1970), the court stated:

[I]t is the value of the "tract or lot of real property" which is assessed, rather than the value of the interest presently held. . . [R]ental income may of course be a relevant factor. However, it cannot be the controlling factor, particularly where it is admittedly misleading as to the fair cash value of the property involved. . . [E]arning capacity is properly regarded as the most significant element in arriving at "fair cash value".

Many factors may prevent a property owner from realizing an income from property that accurately reflects its true earning capacity; but it is the capacity for earning income, rather than the income actually derived, which reflects "fair cash value" for taxation purposes. Id. at 431.

Actual expenses and income can be useful when shown that they are reflective of the market. Although the appellant's attorney made this argument, the appellant did not demonstrate through an expert in real estate valuation that the subject's actual income and expenses are reflective of the market. To demonstrate or estimate the subject's market value using income, one must establish, through the use of market data, the market rent, vacancy and collection losses, and expenses to arrive at a net operating income reflective of the market and the property's capacity for earning income. The appellant did not provide such evidence and, therefore, the Board gives this argument no weight and finds that a reduction based on market value is not warranted.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

Ronald R. Crit

Chairman

K. L. Fan

Member

Richard A. Huff

Member

Mario M. Lino

Member

J. R.

Member

DISSENTING:

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: February 21, 2014

Allen Castrovillari

Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.